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Abstract 
The New European Member States (NMS) are expected to adopt the euro as soon as they fulfil the 
Maastricht criteria, which means that their nominal convergence has been achieved; but the question is: 
should those new European members adopt the euro as soon as possible or should they join the euro 
zone later on, when the real convergence of their economies is well underway? In the mean time, what 
currency system should the new European members adopt before joining the euro zone? Besides, where 
exactly do these NMS stand in terms of nominal convergence? In terms of real convergence, is the 
Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory relevant concerning the new European members? The OCA theory 
states that countries are more suited to belong to a monetary union when they meet certain criteria related 
to  the  real  convergence  of  an  economy:  a  high  degree  of  external  openness,  mobility  of  factors  of 
production,  and  diversification  of  production  structures.  According  to  this  theory,  if  there  is  a  clear 
convergence between business cycles of countries that are willing to join the monetary union and the 
business cycle within the currency area, then this tends to prove that these countries are ready to enter the 
currency area.  
In this paper, we shall see where NMS stand regarding the Maastricht criteria; then we will try to find out 
whether  these  NMS  fulfil  the  criteria  identified  by  the  OCA  theory,  which  are  linked  to  the  real 
convergence  of  an  economy.  Then,  after  having  gone  through  a  survey  of  the  literature  devoted  to 
business cycles synchronisation, we will seek to determine if there is a clear correlation between those 
countries’ business cycles and the European cycle, which would stand in favour of an early adoption of 
the euro in these countries.  
JEL classification: E52, E58, F15, F33 
Keywords: New European Member States, Euro, Enlargement of EMU, Maastricht criteria, 
Central and Eastern European Countries, CEECs, Optimal Currency Area theory. 
1.  Introduction 
Ten countries have joined the European Union (EU) on May 1st, 2004: Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus and 
Malta. Bulgaria and Romania also joined the EU in January 2007. These New Member 
States (NMS) are expected to enter the “Third Phase” of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), thus adopting the euro, as soon as they fulfil the Maastricht criteria, that is to 
say when their economy has reached a level of convergence which makes it possible for 
them to abandon the monetary instrument. At the same time, by trying to fulfil the fiscal 
criteria, they also decide to give up part of the fiscal instrument; indeed, after adoption 
of the European single currency, the use of fiscal policy will still be constrained by the 
Growth and Stability Pact; besides, the applicants are invited to join the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM2) of the European Monetary System (EMS), during at least two years 
without any devaluation, when they are ready to do so.  
Moreover,  real  convergence  is  necessary:  the  NMS’  economies  should  have 
converged  towards  the  Euro(pean)  business  cycle;  but  we  first  need  to  assess  the 
existence of a business cycle which would be specific to the euro area. According to the 
Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory, which was first designed by Mundell (1961), Mac  
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Kinnon  (1963)  and  Kenen  (1969),  these  countries  are  more  suited  to  belong  to  a 
monetary  union  in  so  far  as  they  fulfil  criteria  such  as  a  high  degree  of  external 
openness,  mobility  of  factors  of  production,  and  diversification  of  production 
structures.  
In this paper, we shall see where the 2004-NMS that have not adopted the euro 
yet stand in terms of meeting or not the Maastricht criteria; then we will try to find out 
whether these NMS fulfil the criteria which have been identified by the OCA theory and 
which are more linked to the real convergence of an economy. The OCA theory is thus 
used  to  assess  the  macroeconomic  costs  associated  with  a  participation  of  the  new 
European countries in the European Monetary Union. Then, after having gone through 
a survey of the literature devoted to business cycles synchronisation, we will seek to 
determine if there is a clear correlation between those countries’ business cycles and the 
European cycle, which would stand in favour of an early adoption of the euro in these 
countries.  
Further questions appear such as: among the new European members, have the 
ones that have already joined the ERM2 converged more quickly? Slovenia joined the 
euro area in January 2007, so did Cyprus and Malta one year later, because they fulfilled 
all the Maastricht criteria except for the public debt (which has decreased steadily in 
both countries, and is now below or close to the reference value of 60%); but, for other 
countries that have joined ERM2, is the non-fulfilment of a single criterion sufficient to 
postpone the accession to the euro area, as it was the case for Lithuania and Estonia? 
Given  that,  for  old  member  states,  the  achievement  of  some  criteria  had  been 
interpreted as a tendency, this would tend to indicate that the European institutions do 
not wish to let the new comers join the euro area too quickly. All these questions are in 
fact related to the problem linked to nominal and real economic convergence in the 
NMS: has the latter sufficiently increased lately for an early adoption of the euro in 
those countries? We shall see that two groups of countries emerge, according to the 
OCA  theory:  one  group  which  is  ready  to  join  the  club,  and  the  other  one  which 
includes countries for which it is not yet the best solution.  
2.  The NMS and the Maastricht criteria: has nominal convergence been 
achieved? 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) have chosen a rather rigid 
currency policy at the beginning of the transition period in order to fight inflation, but 
they  have  gradually  privileged  a  more  flexible  exchange  rate  system,  because  of  a 
worsening  of  their  current  accounts  (due  to  the appreciation  of  their  real  exchange 
rate)
1. Indeed, because of the initial undervaluation and the necessity of a catch-up in 
prices which were previously administered, and according to the Balassa-Samuelson
2 
effect (in transition countries, the real exchange rate tends to appreciate because of 
higher  productivity  gains  in  the  tradable  goods  sector),  the  appreciation  of  the  real 
exchange rate is predictable. But it tends to be enhanced by the huge amount of foreign 
direct investment inflows (FDIs) and results in a deterioration of the foreign account. 
This is the reason why the inflation rate is necessarily higher in transition countries, 
                                                 
1 See table No. 2, in the appendices. 
2 Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964.  
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which  makes  the  inflation  criterion  very  difficult  to  fulfil.  This  phenomenon  is 
accompanied in NMS by a rise in the credit growth to the household sector.  
At the end of the nineties, Poland was very representative of this vicious circle, 
strong demand - soaring of the trade deficit - rush of external capital - appreciation of 
the currency. From the beginning of the transition process, it had instituted a crawling 
peg  regime,  which  has  contributed  to  disinflation  and  has  offered  the advantage  of 
legibility; this in turn has attracted international capital. It is indeed by opting for a 
crawling peg regime, along with the liberalization of its economy and the prospect of a 
future participation in EU, that Poland has become very attractive to foreign investors. 
But this regime has also led to a strong appreciation of the zloty, the polish currency, 
which made the management of monetary policy more difficult, and also weakened the 
competitiveness  of  domestic  enterprises.  In  order  to  limit  the  appreciation  of  their 
currency, Polish monetary authorities have then chosen to let the currency float and the 
economy experienced growth again. But in 2004, the zloty started to appreciate again, 
due to the tightening of the monetary policy. According to Meunier (2001), «there is a 
real incompatibility, for the exchange rate, between the objective of catching-up and the 
competitiveness one». A currency that appreciates in real terms allows, all things being 
equal, a mechanical increase in the Gross Domestic Product expressed in euros. That 
certainly helps the catching-up process but it also weakens domestic enterprises, while 
membership  in  EU  supposes  that  the  country  is  able  to  resist  to  the  European 
competition. 
For some of the NMS, entering the ERM2 should not happen too early because 
it implies that they give up the use of their monetary policy, and because a rigorous 
stability  objective  of  the  exchange  rate  might  have  negative  effects  on  the  current 
account, and might lead to a decrease in the competitiveness of the economy that could 
bring  to  an  end  the  convergence  process.  Besides,  the  participation  in  ERM2  is 
foreseeable,  when  convergence  is  clearly  under  way;  otherwise  it  might  result  in  a 
monetary crisis.   
For Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, flexible exchange rates appear to 
have  been  more  appropriate  in  the  past  few  years.  In  November  2006,  the  Polish 
Finance Minister stated that the criteria would normally be met by 2009 and that a 
referendum would be held by 2010 for the population to express itself on the issue of 
euro adoption. But as we shall see the objective now is more remote. As to Hungary, the 
country’s authorities have said that it would probably enter the euro area by 2013. For 
the moment, the country is facing an excessive deficit procedure, due to the level of its 
budget deficit, which increased from 6.4% of GDP in 2004 to 9.2% in 2006, due to a 
tax cut operated by the Hungarian government. The European Commission had even 
envisaged, at the end of 2005, to cut down cohesion funds received by Hungary if the 
authorities did not try to improve the state of their public finances. The budget deficit is 
supposed to be brought back to 4% in 2008 and to 3.6% in 2009. Hungary had in 2001 
opted for a crawling peg regime based on the euro, with a monthly devaluation of 0.2%. 
This  decision  aimed  at  lowering  the  inflation  rate  and  at  preparing  for  ERM2; 
Hungarian monetary authorities wanted to join the euro area before the end of the 
decade.  However,  by  the  end  of  2003,  the  forint  had  to  leave  its  fluctuation  band, 
because of a speculative crisis which led the Hungarian central bank to sharply increase 
the interest rates. Consequently, in 2004, the forint started appreciating again, especially 
after  EU  accession,  and Hungary  has  now  opted  for  a  more  flexible  exchange  rate 
regime.  
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The Czech Republic has also adopted a managed floating regime, with inflation 
targeting. For these countries, the transition towards a relatively fixed exchange rate 
agreement, such as ERM2, is likely to be more difficult, even if the +/– 15% width 
band offers the advantage of flexibility. A study by Bulir and Smidkova (2005) using 
estimated Sustainable Real Exchange Rates shows that under current policies, if they 
entered the ERM2, the currencies of Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary would be 
unlikely  to  stay  within  the  fluctuation  margin  in  the  period  before  2010,  due  to 
significant overvaluation of these currencies before 2003. They suggest that “an early 
race to the euro is likely to do more harm than good, unless macroeconomic policies are 
strengthened”, and that there is a possibility of clash between this appreciation trend of 
real exchange rates, the criteria of low inflation and of a stable nominal exchange rate in 
the framework of ERM2, in those latecomer countries, which still need the “shock-
absorbing role of monetary and exchange rate policies”.  
In  Baltic  countries,  on  the  contrary,  the  advantages  of  tying  the  domestic 
currency to the euro (by means of a currency board based on the euro) have been 
important because of the existence of solid trading links with the EU, and because it has 
provided  an  anchor  to  the  countries’  financial  markets  regarding  long-term 
expectations.
3 An independent monetary policy is not necessarily the best solution for 
these small countries. Estonia and Lithuania have joined the ERM2 on July 1
st, 2004, 
but they could not enter the euro area because they did not fulfil the inflation criterion. 
Cyprus, Malta and Latvia have entered the ERM2 on May 2
nd, 2005, but only the two 
former countries have adopted the euro in January 2008, the latter having a rate of 
inflation  which  was  increasing  severely;  as  to  Slovakia,  it  joined  the  ERM2  on 
November 25
th, 2005 and should adhere to the euro area in January 2009.  
In general, NMS have moved from some kind of soft peg, at the beginning of 
the 90’s, to either flexible exchange rate regimes with inflation targeting (big countries) 
or to currency boards or hard pegs (small countries), in more recent times. 
Concerning nominal convergence, inflation is one of the most difficult criteria to 
meet in transition countries: in Estonia and Lithuania, a rise in regulated prices and in 
public  sector  wages,  combined  with  fast  productivity  growth,  together  with  pegged 
exchange rates, have caused a surge in the inflation rate. This has lead to a “wage-price 
spiral” in “overheating Baltic economies”.
4 In a more recent period, the evolution of the 
inflation rate in Baltic countries has been rather spectacular (see table 1), rising from 4% 
in 2005 to 8.3% in March 2008 in Estonia, and from 6.9% to 12.3% in Latvia (Lithuania 
has a better record than Estonia in terms of inflation, but still lies above the Maastricht 
reference value of 3.2% in March 2008). Inflation rates have also risen considerably in 
Hungary and in the Czech Republic, contrary to Poland which has managed to keep the 
inflation rate under control (see table 4).  
Concerning  the  inflation  rate,  the  European  commission  uses  the  notion  of 
“core inflation”, in order to isolate the effect of the sharp increase in prices of energy 
and unprocessed food; its Spring 2008 economic forecast shows that core inflation in 
the euro area has increased to 2.7% year on year, at the end of March 2008, whereas the 
headline inflation, or Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), stands at 3.6%. 
From tables 2 and 4 in the appendices, we can see, through the evolution of these two 
                                                 
3 CESifo, 2004. 
4 International Center for Economic Growth European Center – Quarterly report on the New Member States, ICEG EC, Autumn 2006.  
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indicators for each of the NMS, that the difference is sizeable, especially in the recent 
period of severe increase in the prices of oil and commodities; but even when energy 
and unprocessed food prices are excluded from the calculation of the HICP, we still 
have very high rates in several NMS, in March 2008: in the Czech Republic (6.6%), 
Estonia (9.4%), Latvia (15.7%), Lithuania (9.7%) and Hungary (5.6%); even Slovenia 
which has adopted the euro faces a rate of 5.8%. 
The notion of core inflation is useful to properly measure the evolution of price 
movements; Aghajanyan (2005) states that “core inflation expresses the general trends 
of inflation (…) it shows long-term price movements. Thus, its movements are free 
from  the  influence  of  seasonal  and  random  factors  and  are  characterized  by  low 
variability”.
5 Nevertheless, according to a recent debate, the core inflation is no longer 
represented solely by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or by the HICP, from which 
energy and unprocessed food have been excluded, but rather by other indices using 
diverse  techniques,  with  a  statistical  approach  instead  of  the  behavioural  approach 
linked to the cost of living (Wynne 2008, Vega and Wynne 2001).  
However, if we isolate a trend in inflation rates in NMS throughout the last 6 
years, we can clearly see a sharp increase in 2004 and then in 2007 in most of the 
countries that have not yet entered the euro area, but mostly in Estonia, Latvia and 
Hungary and this holds true whether we include the energy and food prices or not. In 
May  2008,  the  HICP  rate  was  of  11.4%  in  Estonia,  17.7%  in  Latvia and  12.3%  in 
Lithuania, compared to 4% in the EU and to 3.7% in the euro area.
6 The recent trend in 
the oil and commodity prices is not the only explanation to this overall increase in the 
inflation rate; another factor lies in the rise in some regulated prices as well as in excise 
taxes, and in a slight increase in inflation expectations, together with a pressure on 
wages mostly in the non-tradable sector (in the services sector). Of course in Baltic 
countries (Estonia, Latvia and to a lesser extent Lithuania), the surge in inflation has 
accompanied a very high economic growth rate, with a tightening of the labour market 
that has lead to increases in wages above the productivity growth; but these economies 
are slowing down now, which should enable the inflation rate to decrease slightly in the 
near future.
7  
Nevertheless, price stability remains a crucial issue in Baltic States, whereas in 
countries of Central Europe the delay concerning euro adoption is mainly caused by 
fiscal imbalances (even if Hungary also suffers from an increasing inflation rate). The 
Czech Republic has seen its public debt double from 1998 to 2004, although the peak 
was still far from the reference value, but the trend is now reversed and the public debt 
has  decreased  from  30.5%  in  2005  to  28.7%  in  2007;  the  public  deficit  is  also 
decreasing,  to  1.4%  of  GDP.  Until  2004,  this  upward  trend  was  caused  by  several 
factors: slight decrease in indirect tax revenues due to a slower expansion of domestic 
demand, rise in public-sector wages; moreover, the accession to the EU had boosted 
budget expenditure (through the co-financing procedure, but also because of upcoming 
elections in most of the countries). But the Czech Republic has managed to “put its 
house in order” in terms of public finances.  
On the opposite, Hungary has seen its public deficit and its public debt rise 
sharply in the recent period, as we have already mentioned: except for the year 2000 the 
                                                 
5 “Core inflation in a small transition country: choice of optimal measures”, EJCE, Vol.2, n°1. 
6 See table 2, in the appendices. 
7 ECB Convergence Report, May 2008.  
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public deficit has always, throughout the last decade, exceeded the 3% benchmark, while 
being  also  very  volatile,  whereas  the  public  debt  was  decreasing  until  2001  before 
soaring again until it reached 66% of GDP in 2007. If we look at the annual change in 
the public deficit, we see that the non-cyclical factors represent the bulk of the change, 
and  that  they  mainly  illustrate  expansionary  policies.  Hungary  should  bring  back  its 
budget deficit below the Maastricht reference by 2010, through two channels: first by 
undertaking a more efficient collection of taxes and secondly through a reduction in 
administration  and  social  security  expenditure;  but  is  it  possible  with  an  ageing 
population? As the ECB points out, measures need to be taken before the worsening of 
the demographic situation; nonetheless, “Hungary is assessed as being at high risk in 
terms of the sustainability of public finances”.
8 
Poland  on  the  contrary  has  managed  to  reverse  in  2003  the  rising  trend 
concerning its budget deficit; in 2007 it stood at 2%, but is expected to reach 2.5% of 
GDP in 2008.
9 Government debt is lower than the 60% of GDP required for EMU 
participation, although it continues to grow because of the existence of primary deficits. 
But Poland also faces the risk of an ageing population As to Slovakia, it now fulfils all 
the convergence criteria, in particular the ones related to public finances.  
Regarding long-term interest rates, it is not very easy to compare performances 
because the capital markets of NMS are not as developed. However, this criterion does 
not seem to be the main issue, even if nominal interest rates are generally slightly higher 
than in Western EU countries. Nevertheless, all NMS stand below the present reference 
value (6.5%) except for Hungary. 
Concerning  exchange  rates,  the  currencies  need  to  remain  stable  in  the 
framework of the EMS for countries willing to adopt the euro in the near future. Baltic 
countries  have  already  remained  more  than  two  years  in  the  ERM2,  but  Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic do not seem ready to enter the system. Another issue 
needs to be tackled concerning the large current account deficits that many of the NMS 
still have. The risk exists of a slowing down of capital inflows, since the privatisation 
process is almost finished; this might represent a threat for countries that depend on 
these FDIs for the financing of their external account deficit.  
Slovakia meets all the requirements for the moment; and should join the euro 
area in January 2009; inflation is still too high in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which 
will probably have to wait at least until January 2010 to adopt the euro; as to Hungary it 
faces other problems, mostly linked to public imbalances as we have seen; in reality, it 
seems  as  if  these  countries  have  not  really  managed  to  converge  in  nominal  terms. 
However, one must keep in mind that they entered the EU four years ago and that they 
underwent huge reforms and efforts. Poland and the Czech Republic have recently been 
more successful in terms of nominal convergence, in particular as the public deficit is 
concerned, although they have preferred to stay outside of ERM2. Both currencies have 
experienced rather high volatility in the past few years. 
As Filacek et al. (2006) point out, the criteria of inflation and exchange rate are 
difficult  to  fulfil  simultaneously,  especially  when  countries  experience  a  long-term 
appreciation of their real exchange rates. For Van Aarle (2006), the fiscal conservatism 
required both by the Maastricht criteria and the Growth and Stability Pact is difficult to 
                                                 
8 ECB Convergence Report, May 2008. 
9 See table 1, in the appendices.  
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observe for a transition country, together with the removal of monetary flexibility. In 
most  countries,  the  public  deficit  criteria  should  be  considered  as  a  trend,  if  the 
European  institutions  are  to  let  these  transition  countries  join  the  euro  area  in  a 
reasonable time frame. Besides Italy and Belgium did not fulfil the public debt criterion 
in 1998, nor did Greece two years later. European institutions then chose to interpret 
some criteria as trends. Nevertheless, it was not the case for Estonia and Lithuania, 
since they were denied accession because of their high inflation rate.  
Poland and the Czech Republic have managed in recent years to bring down 
their public deficits; for Hungary, fiscal consolidation must continue but it should not 
be  realized  in  a  short  while,  since  it  might  hinder  growth  and  real  convergence, 
especially at a time when the country experiences a lower growth than its neighbours. 
Overall,  the  main  issue  that  these  countries  face  is  real  convergence,  which  is  the 
process of catching up in terms of standard of living and productivity, and which does 
not  necessarily  go  along  with  nominal  convergence  in  the  short-run.  According  to 
economic theory, in the long run, price stability and fiscal discipline are supposed to 
encourage growth.  
Trying to meet the convergence criteria too early is likely to slow down the 
growth pace, which in turn may endanger the process of catching up. The NMS have 
very different levels of income: concerning the average standard of living, Slovenia is far 
more advanced than Estonia or Lithuania. Real convergence remains an issue in these 
countries. Besides, Estonia has an important external deficit, which means that if FDIs 
inflows should decrease in the future, the financing process of this deficit might become 
more difficult, which might lead to a monetary crisis.  
Concerning the type of exchange rate system adopted by NMS during the last 
years of the transition period, as noted by Tuma (2003), the ERM2 does not have any 
value added compared to currency board regimes, which is not much different from a 
de facto adoption of the euro; for countries that have had currency boards (Estonia, 
Lithuania in 2003), an early adoption of the euro would have been logical, according to 
the  author,  with  a  much  shorter  membership  period  in  the  ERM2.  For  inflation 
targeting countries on the other hand, participation in the ERM2 “introduces a potential 
inconsistency  into  their  modern  monetary  policy  regimes,  which  may,  under 
unfavourable circumstances, increase the risk of their macroeconomic destabilisation”.  
As De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004) explain, there is a conflict between nominal 
and  real  convergence  during  the  EMU  run-up  of  CEECs;  in  particular,  inflation  is 
necessarily higher due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect of productivity driven inflation, 
as  mentioned  previously.  They  show  that  although  some  countries  should  follow  a 
policy of fiscal consolidation, in order to control inflation, it will induce a necessary cost 
in  terms  of  growth;  for  some  countries,  this  inflation  issue  might  be  dealt  with  by 
allowing a gradual nominal appreciation of their currency within the ERM2.; in this 
approach, “nominal appreciation within the ERM2 band may be a viable alternative for 
restrictive fiscal policies”; this does not apply to the Baltic States which have adopted 
hard pegs to the euro; “countries committed to hard euro pegs might choose fiscal 
contraction  as  the  second  best  solution”.  On  the  opposite,  Poland  and  the  Czech 
Republic have already allowed a significant appreciation of their currencies which puts 
them in a better position concerning EMU as the inflation criterion is concerned.  
Zapal and Schneider (2006) believe that in the NMS that do not respect the 
fiscal  rules,  there  is  a  clear  tendency  of  leading  lax  fiscal  policies  and  postponing 
structural reforms; according to them, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, but also  




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
276 
Malta and Cyprus, which have adopted the euro since (although Malta had a public debt 
slightly exceeding the criterion), “demonstrate their failure to put fiscal policy in order 
even at time of exceptionally supportive environment”, that is with robust economic 
performance  and  the  perspective  of  joining  the  euro  area.  On  the  contrary,  Baltic 
countries have showed a strong will of reform and responsible fiscal policies that have 
enabled them to fulfil the budgetary criteria.  
3.  The  NMS  and  the  Optimum  Currency  Area  theory:  has  real 
convergence increased according to OCA criteria? 
Maastricht  criteria  are  related  to  nominal  convergence  as  we  have  seen;  real 
convergence  needs  to  be  assessed  considering  other  criteria,  among  which  those 
developed by the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory; this theory was implemented in 
the 1960s by Robert Mundell,
10 and enriched both by Ronald Mac Kinnon (1963) and 
Peter Kenen (1969). In order for a monetary union to be qualified as optimal, countries 
that belong to this area should fulfil several criteria, such as the degree of openness of 
the country, its industrial diversification and the mobility of production factors; indeed, 
factor  markets  must  be  sufficiently  flexible  to  absorb  shocks  in  a  context  where 
exchange rate movements are no longer possible.  
For the time being, the two first criteria do not seem to pose problem: NMS are 
open economies and they trade more and more with old EU Member States. Moreover, 
diversification of production structures in NMS is increasing very rapidly. According to 
Boone  and  Maurel  (1999),  in  some  of  the  CEECs,  a  strong  correlation  with  the 
European cycle (notably with Germany) appears, which stands in favour of an early 
adoption of the euro, in particular in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary; the 
monetary anchorage policy, chosen at least until recent years, might have contributed to 
strengthen the degree of symmetry of shocks and stabilized inflationary anticipations, 
thus reducing risk premiums and facilitating investments.  
Nevertheless, Boone and Maurel remind us that the fiscal criterion is for the 
moment hardly compatible with the real convergence objective, which requires an active 
budgetary  policy.  The  model  of  Frankel  and  Rose  (1998),  that  shed  light  on  an 
endogenous cycle’s hypothesis, favoured by trade integration, pleads in favour of an 
accelerated membership of the most advanced countries to the euro area; indeed a rise 
in  trade  relations  enabled  by  an  early  adoption  of  the  euro  by  applicant  countries 
strengthens  the  synchronization  of  cycles,  which  tends  to  “increase  the  aptitude  of 
countries which, ex ante, do not satisfy the criteria of entry in the monetary union, to 
satisfy them ex post”. However Frankel and Rose point out that when countries have 
not  finished  the  first  phase  of  the  transition  yet  (relative  price  restructuring  and 
economic growth recovery), a strategy of anchorage might be counter-productive.  
As  explained  by  Babetskii  (2004),  this  endogeneity  argument  described  by 
Frankel  and  Rose  (1998),  according  to  which  increasing  trade  relations  between 
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countries of the monetary union reduce asymmetries between countries, illustrates the 
position  taken  by  the European  Commission  in 2000, for  which  “closer integration 
leads  to  less  frequent  asymmetric  shocks  and  to  more  synchronised  business  cycles 
between  countries”  which  in  turn  makes  it  possible  and  less  costly  for  a  common 
monetary policy to operate; on the contrary, according to what De Grauwe (1997) has 
called the “Krugman view”, Krugman (1993) believes that closer integration leads to 
higher specialisation which in turn brings about more idiosyncratic shocks. Babetskii has 
tested both views and comes up with the following conclusion: by trying to identify 
demand and supply shocks for CEECs, taking Germany and the EU-15 as benchmarks, 
he finds that “an increase in trade intensity leads to higher symmetry of demand shocks” 
and that “a decrease in exchange rate volatility has a positive effect on demand shock 
convergence”, which tends to support the European Commission’s view, or Frankel and 
Rose’s view; concerning supply shocks, the results appear to be either ambiguous, either 
not significant.  
Rose (2000) shows later on that currency unions increase trade in participating 
countries  by  300%  on  average;  another  study  by  Micco,  Stein  and  Ordonez  (2003) 
confirms this increase in trade as being an important benefit from joining a currency 
union, albeit in a lower proportion (between 4 and 16% for EMU); moreover they find 
that the microeconomic benefits of EMU are more important than the macroeconomic 
cost  of  losing  the  monetary  instrument.  Bayoumi  et  al.  (2005)  also  find  that  the 
accession of NMS to the euro area is likely to bring about many benefits stemming from 
lower  transaction  costs  and  higher  trade  integration,  leading  to  rising  output  and 
consumption, enhanced financial integration, lower real interest rates and an increase in 
investment.  
Markiewicz (2006) shows that emerging countries that have a high budget deficit 
are not likely to adopt a peg, whereas economies that tend to have high inflation will 
have a more flexible de facto exchange rate regime: “high inflation in a pegged regime 
causes a loss of competitiveness and results in pressure for devaluation”; in order to 
maintain the parity, the central bank will have to raise the level of interest rates, which in 
turn will have a negative impact on the budget deficit. According to Markiewicz, “a 
fixed  exchange  rate  is  less  likely  to  be  chosen  if  a  country  has  not  achieved 
macroeconomic  stabilization”,  conclusion  that  is  consistent  with  the  literature  on 
currency crises. When analysing the OCA criteria, applied to emerging economies, the 
author finds that on the one hand “a fixed exchange rate regime is associated with 
smaller economies”, but that on the other hand “a country is less likely to adopt a fixed 
exchange rate regime if its external trade is highly concentrated with the EU”, since 
geographical concentration of trade means higher vulnerability to shocks. From this 
study,  we  can  draw  conclusions  concerning  the  NMS,  and  in  particular  that  fixed 
exchange rates do not necessarily represent the best solution  for  some of our euro 
applicants.  
Moore and Pentecost (2006) use a structural VAR model in order to examine 
the flexibility of labour markets in eight EU countries (four old and four new members) 
by analyzing the responsiveness of real wages to temporary and permanent shocks. They 
find that there are longer persistent disequilibria in labour markets in Italy, Poland and 
Slovakia, which means that these countries exhibit a low flexibility in this market; the 
Czech Republic and Hungary are more “suitable candidates for membership in the Euro 
area, at least from the perspective of the degree of wage flexibility”. They conclude that 
“in practice, Euro-area membership should depend not only on the nominal Maastricht  
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criteria, but also on the degree of labour market flexibility”; from this point of view, 
some of the NMS may prove better candidates for joining the euro area than present 
members.  
Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) also argue that NMS do not have more rigid labour 
markets than old MS, which tends to indicate that they are not less suitable for EMU; 
they  conclude  that  “even  though  labour  markets  in  NMS  have  some  structural 
problems, highlighted by large and stagnant pools of unemployment, they do not seem 
to work any worse than the labour markets in many current EMU countries”. Early 
adoption of the euro would rather encourage job creation, by modifying wage setting 
due to budgetary discipline. In particular, Baltic States seem to have a higher labour 
market flexibility degree than current EMU members.  
Regarding the question as to whether the euro area at present is an OCA, Lane 
(2006) argues that there is increasing evidence that the monetary union has increased 
trade and financial integration among participants; however, “the euro area is still some 
distance from the definition of an optimum currency area”; besides, structural rigidities 
in the labour and goods markets remain, and political integration is still lacking. For 
Lane,  “it  remains  an  open  question  whether  national  economies  will  prove  to  be 
sufficiently flexible to enable smooth adjustment in the event of a major asymmetric 
shock  or  a  financial  crisis”;  moreover,  the  author  believes  that  “EMU  acts  as  an 
amplification mechanism for asymmetric shocks”, in the sense that a common nominal 
interest rate automatically leads to a divergence in real interest rates in members of the 
euro area, because of differences in national inflation rates.  
For Van De Coevering (2003), Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have 
converged more quickly towards the euro area in terms of growth of intra-industry 
trade;  concerning  output,  only  Hungary and  Slovenia  display  a  significant  degree  of 
convergence but overall, from an OCA perspective, most countries, even in the euro 
area, have diverged instead of converging since the mid-nineties. Breuss, Fink and Haiss 
(2004) seem to be more confident in the sense that, for them, from a purely economic 
perspective  there  are  more  arguments  which  stand  in  favour  of  an  early  EMU 
membership, because of the convergence already accomplished by NMS; the authors 
show that benefits of early membership outweigh the costs. Moreover, concerning the 
Maastricht criteria, they point out that (with 2003 figures) if all 25 EU countries were 
part of the euro area, “the overall inflation rate would increase by 0.1%, the average 
budget deficit would remain unchanged at 2.7%, the average debt level would fall from 
70.4 to 63%, the average rate of interest would go up from 4.1% to 4.5%”; they remind 
us that, after all, the total GDP of the ten NMS only represent 5% of the EU-15’s GDP, 
and that the only remaining issue that must be dealt with is the high level of bad debts in 
Poland and Malta; but this should not prevent all ten NMS from joining the euro area 
quickly, according to the authors.  
4.  Is there a clear correlation between the NMS’ business cycles and the 
European business cycle? 
First of all, we need to assess the existence of a European business cycle. De 
Haan,  Inklaar  and  Jong-a-Pin  (2005)  provide  a  very  useful  survey  of  the  empirical 
research existing on the  issue of business cycle synchronization and remind us that 
“most  of  the  current  evidence  suggests  that  periods  of  greater  and  lesser 
synchronization tend to alternate. Still, there is quite some evidence that during the 90s,  
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business  cycle  synchronization  in  the  euro  area  has  increased”.  However,  they  also 
mention the fact that conclusions obtained through various studies often differ because 
of differences in periods surveyed, data and benchmarks used; even when using the 
same methodology, estimation results sometimes differ widely. They conclude that the 
synchronization process has indeed increased, during the 1990s, due to higher trade 
intensity, and that “the business cycles of many euro countries are still substantially out 
of sync (…) and that there is not a monotone movement towards the emergence of a 
“European” business cycle”, which makes the design of monetary policy particularly 
difficult.  
For Bower and Guillemineau (2006), the implementation of the single European 
market has improved trade relations across the euro area, which in turn has contributed 
to higher business cycle symmetry. Besides, the introduction of a single currency has led 
to intensified intra-trade industry, or similarity of trade specialisation patterns, “which 
has become the main driving force ensuring the coherence of business cycles”; once 
again, this supports the conclusion of Frankel and Rose (1998), according to whom 
there is an endogeneity of OCA criteria.  
Artis  (2003)  indicates  on  the  contrary  that  it  is  difficult  to  identify  “a 
homogenous or developing European business cycle” and that “globalisation may be 
proceeding as fast as Europeanization”; indeed, the author uses GDP data for a panel of 
23 countries over a 30 year time-frame, and finds out that the US and Japan sometimes 
are found to be closely linked to European core countries, more closely than other 
European countries (Great Britain, Portugal, Ireland or Scandinavian countries). Hence, 
Artis concludes that “there is not a monotone movement towards the emergence of a 
highly coherent and exclusive European cycle”.  
Nevertheless, although the existence of a real European business cycle is not an 
uncontested  fact,  we  shall  review  the  literature  devoted  to  business  cycle 
synchronisation, in order to determine if there is a clear correlation between the euro 
applicants’ business cycles and the European cycle, assuming that there is one, or simply 
with business cycles of core countries of the euro area; if this is proven, then it would 
stand in favour of an early adoption of the euro by these countries.  
According  to  Weimann  (2003),  who  uses  methodologies  linked  to  the  OCA 
theory, with a structural VAR approach, in order to identify economic shocks that have 
hit the countries wishing to join the euro area, in the past, correlations of these shocks 
with those of current EMU countries shed light on the question of whether a common 
monetary policy may be suitable or not in CEECs. He believes that “one cannot judge 
the CEECs as worse accession candidates than present EMU members”, with regard to 
asymmetric shocks, which means that “they are not systematically less suitable for EMU 
than its present members”. Among the NMS, Hungary appears to be the most strongly 
correlated with the euro area for both shock types, according to Weimann.  
On  the  other  hand,  as  Berger  (2004)  explains,  “economic  trends  still  differ 
greatly in the old and new member states”, which argues against undue haste in pursuit 
of euro membership. In NMS, growth rates are much higher, as well as inflation rates, 
due to FDI inflows and to catching-up effects, than in old MS; that is why, for Berger, a 
single monetary policy is not likely to fit all EU countries. Business cycles are far from 
being synchronized between Western and Eastern countries, even with stronger trade 
integration: “it is the demand side that represents the greatest obstacle to closer business 
cycle  synchronization  with  the  euro  area  (…)  because  of  sustained  differences  in 
consumer behaviour and fiscal policy”. Thus, the fact that countries that adopt the euro  
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lose the possibility of using the exchange rate policy can be annoying for the ones that 
have divergent economic cycles. On the contrary, countries with high inflation rates 
would be better off if they entered the ERM2, since it would enable them to put the 
accent on price stability.  
Similarly, Kontolemis and Ross (2005) point out that real demand shocks seem 
to  explain  a  relatively  small  part  of  the  variance  of  exchange  rates  in  Estonia  and 
Lithuania; in addition, they find that “Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia seem 
to be influenced significantly by demand shocks, a finding which suggest that an early 
move to join ERM2 could, ceteris paribus, be more problematic in the short to medium 
term”.  For  Carmignani  (2005),  European  emerging  market  economies  are  poorly 
synchronized  with  the  euro  area  except  for  Hungary  and  Poland,  for  which 
synchronization is significant.  
Nevertheless, Kutan and Yigit (2005) find a strong evidence of a real stochastic 
convergence in CEECs, meaning that they adjust to euro area output shocks, although 
nominal convergence to EU standards still appears idiosyncratic; the Baltic states exhibit 
the  strongest  convergence  (in  particular  concerning  monetary  policy  and  price  level 
convergence, due to their hard peg exchange rate regime), indicating that they can join 
the euro area. But the other CEECs show little convergence with the euro area (when 
using Germany as a benchmark) and should rather focus on fiscal discipline instead of 
wanting to join the ERM too soon.  
Firdnuc  and  Korhonen  (2001)  study  the  correlation  of  supply  and  demand 
shocks between CEECs and the euro area countries (not only with Germany as often), 
through the 90’s; they come up with several interesting findings: firstly, they confirm 
that  members  of  the  euro  area  present  a  high  correlation,  even  Italy  which  was 
considered as “peripheral”; then, they find that supply shocks in some CEECs such as 
Hungary and Estonia are quite highly correlated with euro area shocks, partly because of 
the huge amount of FDI inflows, and the existence of extensive trade relations with 
western EU countries; Slovenia also shows a good although lower correlation index, but 
in other CEECs, the asymmetry of business cycles continues to be important, which 
means that an early adoption of the euro may be problematic. Finally Hungary also has a 
high correlation of demand shocks with the euro area.  
As  to  Frenkel  and  Nickel  (2002),  they  show  a  clear  correlation  of  demand 
shocks between some CEECs (Poland and Hungary) and the euro area; nevertheless, 
concerning  supply  shocks,  Poland  seems  to  be  the  only  country  demonstrating  a 
negative correlation. In a later study, Frenkel and Nickel (2005) find that some of the 
more  advanced  CEECs  have  relatively  strong  economic  links  with  major  euro  area 
members  and  therefore  may  be  better  prepared  for  the  euro,  such  as  the  Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Hungary, even though overall, “CEECs as a group exhibit still 
considerably different disturbances and adjustment paths” as compared with euro area 
countries.  In  addition,  Eickmeier  and  Breitung  (2005),  when  investigating  co-
movements  between  CEECs  and  the  euro  area,  find  that  there  is  considerable 
heterogeneity among CEECs, meaning that, for some of them, accession to EMU is 
likely  to  be  more  costly;  but  they  find  that  Poland,  Slovenia,  Hungary,  Estonia  are 
“more suitable EMU candidates”.  
According to Traistaru (2005), bilateral correlations of business cycles between 
the euro area and NMS are low, suggesting that “the new EU countries are not part of 
an  optimal  currency  area  in  the  traditional  sense”,  although  similarity  of  economic  
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structures  and  deeper  trade  integration  should  allow  for  a  higher  business  cycle 
convergence  in  the  long-run.  Likewise,  Bower  (2005)  finds  that  the  degree  of  real 
integration achieved by CEECs is still low; therefore they might incur huge short-term 
costs if they adopt the euro too soon. A study of the convergence of the real economy, 
proxied by GDP and industrial production of CEECs, with the euro area indeed shows 
that  only  Slovenia  exhibits  a  synchronised  common  cycle;  but  the  Czech  Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia can also “be considered of an intermediate degree of cyclical 
movement with the euro area”.  
Moreover, Artis, Marcellino and Proietti (2004) analyse the evolution of business 
cycles in accession countries, and they find that for most of them the adoption of the 
euro in a near future is not necessarily recommended, in the light of the OCA theory. In 
particular, the degree of concordance among the accession countries is not as large as 
within  the  euro  area  members,  except  for  Baltic  countries;  furthermore  the 
synchronization between the two groups is low concerning GDP data; when looking the 
industrial production, Baltic countries continue to form an integrated economic area, 
comprising also the Czech Republic; besides, Hungary is highly correlated with the euro 
zone,  and  Germany  has  a  very  high  “cyclical  sympathy”  with  a  group  made  up  of 
Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, Hungary and the Czech Republic concerning concordance 
measures. Overall, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia are the closest to the euro area, in 
terms of real convergence.  
In Darvas and Szapary (2004), Hungary, Poland and Slovenia again appear as 
being the CEECs that have achieved a high degree of synchronisation with the EMU 
for GDP, industrial production and exports, but not for consumption and services; 
besides some evidence is found of a high synchronization of business cycles among 
euro area members themselves. Another paper by Darvas, Rose and Szapary (2005) 
shows, by using data from 21 OECD countries, that reduced fiscal deficits increase 
business  cycle  synchronization;  in  that  sense,  the  Maastricht  criteria  might  have 
“indirectly moved Europe closer to an OCA, by reducing countries’ abilities to create 
idiosyncratic fiscal shocks”.  
Finally, Firdnuc and Korhonen (2006) offer a very interesting “Meta-analysis of 
the business cycle correlation between the euro area and the CEECs”, in which they 
review 35 studies related to this topic; their main finding is that, on the whole, CEECs 
have comparably high correlation with the euro area business cycle, even if “estimation 
methodologies  can  have  a  significant  effect  on  correlation  coefficients”;  this  meta-
analysis also points out that “the highest average estimates of business cycle correlation 
with  the  euro  area  are  reported  for  Hungary,  followed  by  Slovenia  and  Poland”. 
Furthermore,  Hungary  is  more  highly  correlated  with  the  euro  area  than  peripheral 
countries such as Greece, Ireland or Portugal. Then comes a group of countries that 
exhibit a lower degree of correlation with the euro area, comprising the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, and Latvia; Finally, Slovakia has a positive but small correlation index and 
Lithuania exhibits negative correlation with the euro area.  
As indicated by the authors, this study demonstrates that overall, “the available 
estimates  of  business  cycle  correlation  provide  a  fairly  consistent  ranking  of  the 
CEECs”.  This  review  of  the  literature  devoted  to  OCA  theory  and  business  cycle 
convergence shows that there is no clear-cut answer to the question; the results in terms 
of NMS being or not correlated with euro area members often differ widely across the 
various  studies,  and  depend  both  on  the  methodologies  and  data  that  are  used. 
Nevertheless, some countries seem to have converged more than others towards the  
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Euro area cycle, if we judge by the frequency of their favourable citation among the 
results of the different studies that are analysed in this paper: Hungary, Slovenia, the 
Czech  Republic  and  Poland  are  often  cited  as  being  “more  suitable  candidates  for 
EMU”; then come the Baltic States, then Slovakia.  
This is particularly interesting in the sense that, among the four that are ahead of 
the list, we have three countries (Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland) for which euro 
adoption will happen probably much later, because nominal convergence has not totally 
been achieved yet, and because their currency has not entered the ERM2 for the time 
being. These bigger countries have chosen more flexible exchange rate arrangements, in 
order to deal with the appreciation of their currency, as compared to Baltic States for 
example. They seem to have converged more quickly in real terms, when analysing the 
criteria of the OCA theory and business cycle convergence in particular, towards the 
euro  area,  although,  in  terms  of  nominal  convergence,  they  have  not  proved  very 
successful.  
Concerning Slovenia, the convergence has happened both in real and in nominal 
terms, since the country has managed to meet the Maastricht criteria. As indicated by 
the European Commission (2006), the catching-up process has been considerable in 
Slovenia, in terms of GDP per capita, labour productivity and employment rate; besides, 
trade links with the euro area have increased quickly, as well as FDI inflows from the 
EU, and Slovenia is one of the NMS which has an industrial structure comparable to 
that of the euro area. The report states that “Slovenia’s economic cycle is already well 
synchronized with the euro area and that the correlation of its cycle to the euro-area 
average is comparable to that of several current  EMU member states”. Cyprus and 
Malta have also adopted the euro and Slovakia is on the brink of joining as well. 
Concerning Estonia and Lithuania, that were not authorized to join the euro 
area in January 2007, despite their successful membership in the ERM2 and despite their 
fulfilment of all criteria except the inflation one, we may wonder whether this decision 
follows from a will of European institutions to “strictly apply the rules” or whether it is 
linked to the studies above mentioned that demonstrate that these countries have not 
converged enough towards the euro area business cycle. 
5.  Conclusion 
The NMS have accomplished considerable efforts in order to enter the EU. The 
next step for them will be to join the euro area. Beside the issue of the correct timing of 
the entry in the ERM2, the parity of their currency should not be overvalued, which 
would put the economy under pressure; the aim is also to allow the catching up process 
to continue. In effect, the conversion rate of the currency against the euro will be the 
last ERM2 bilateral central rate. An overvalued conversion rate might hurt the country’s 
competitiveness. As shown by Fic, Barrell and Holland (2006), the short run benefits 
and costs of euro area accession in CEECs will also depend on the set ERM2 entry rate; 
Baltic  States  appear  to  be  in  a  better  situation  in  this  respect,  as  compared  to  big 
economies like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.  
There are many constraints attached with an early entering in EMU, on the 
monetary level but also as fiscal policy is concerned, because of the convergence criteria 
followed by the constraint of the Stability and Growth Pact. By adopting the euro too 
early, there is a risk of slowing the growth trend and the economic catch-up. For the 
Baltic countries, the adoption of the euro can be envisaged in the short term, whereas  
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the Czech Republic, as well as Poland and Hungary, might have to wait a little longer. 
As we have already mentioned, price stability seems to remain a crucial issue in Baltic 
States, whereas in countries of Central Europe the delay concerning euro adoption will 
mainly be caused by fiscal imbalances. On the other hand, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary  and,  although  at  a  lesser  extent,  Estonia  appear  to  have  converged  more 
quickly towards the euro area business cycle, which would tend to indicate that they are 
ready to join the euro area; this is rather contradictory and brings us back to the initial 
debate  on  the  appropriateness  of  the  Maastricht  criteria,  that  essentially  focus  on 
nominal convergence whereas the real convergence expressed in the increase of the 
standard  of  living  in  those  transition  countries  seems  to  be  more  relevant.  The 
inconsistency between some of those criteria, in particular in catching-up countries, has 
been identified by several authors as we have seen. Finally, in terms of inflation, it is 
very likely that NMS will continue to have higher inflation rates than current euro area 
members, but the impact on the euro area inflation rate is very small: as shown by Egert 
(2002), a difference in inflation rates between initial euro members and latecomers of 
3% would lead to a rise in the GDP weighted euro inflation rate of only 0.1%.  
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Appendices: 
Table 1: Situation of the ten 2004-NMS regarding Maastricht criteria 







(% of GDP) 
Public Debt 
(% of GDP) 
Estonia  2005  4.1  3.94  Yes  1.6  4.8 
  2006  4.4  3.8  Yes  3.4  4.2 
  2007  6.7  4.3  Yes  2.8  3.4 
  2008
2  8.3  4.5  Yes  0.4  3.4 
Latvia  2005  6.9  3.59  Yes  0.2  11.9 
  2006  6.6  4.1  Yes  -0.2  10.7 
  2007  10.1  5.3  Yes  0.0  9.7 
  2008
2  12.3  5.4  Yes  -1.1  10.0 
Lithuania  2005  2.7  3.78  Yes  -0.5  18.7 
  2006  3.8  4.1  Yes  -0.5  18.2 
  2007  5.8  4.5  Yes  -1.2  17.3 
  2008
2  7.4  4.6  Yes  -1.7  17.0 
Poland  2005  2.2  5.16  No  -4,8  42,5 
  2006  1.3  5.2  No  -3.8  47.6 
  2007  2.6  5.5  No  -2.0  45.2 
  2008
2  3.2  5.7  No  -2.5  44.5 
Hungary  2005  3.5  6,89  No  -6,1  58,4 
  2006  4.0  7.1  No  -9.2  65.6 
  2007  7.9  6.7  No  -5.5  66.0 
  2008
2  7.5  6.9  No  -4.0  66.5 
Czech Rep.  2005  1.6  3,61  No  -2,6  30,5 
  2006  2.1  3.8  No  -2.7  29.4 
  2007  3.0  4.3  No  -1.6  28.7 
  2008
2  4.4  4.5  No  -1.4  28.1 
Slovakia  2005  2.8  3,62  Yes  -2,9  34,5 
  2006  4.3  3.5  Yes  -3.6  30.4 
  2007  1.9  9.33  Yes  -2.2  29.4 
  2008
2  2.2  2.5  Yes  -2.0  29.2 
Slovenia  2005  2.5  3,69  Yes  -1,8  29,1 
  2006  2.5  3.85  Yes  -1.2  27.1 
  2007  3.8  4.5  Euro  -0.1  24.1 
  2008
2  5.4  -  Euro  -0.6  23.4 
Cyprus  2005  2,0  4,09  Yes  -2,4  70,3 
  2006  2.2  4.13  Yes  -1.2  65.2 
  2007  2.2  4.5  Yes  3.3  59.8 
  2008
2  3.8  -  Euro  1.7  47.3 
Malta  2005  2,5  4,39  Yes  -3,3  74,7 
  2006  2.6  4.32  Yes  -2.5  64.7 
  2007  0.7  4.7  Yes  -1.8  62.6 
  2008
2  3.4  -  Euro  -1.6  60.6 
Ref. value4    3.2  6.5  Yes  -3.0  60 
1: average of the last 12 months, 10-years benchmark bonds on government debt. 
2: average annual percentage change; 2008 data refer to the period April 2007 - March 2008. 
3: with effect from March 19 2007, the central rate of the Slovakian currency in ERM2 was revalued by 8.5%. 
4: refers to the period April 2007-March 2008 for the inflation rate and long-term interest rate. 
Source: DB Research, Eurostat, European Commission.  




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
285 
Table 2: Inflation rate in non-euro NMS, with and without food and energy 
  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Estonia  HICP  3.6  1.4  3.0  4.1  4.4  6.7 
  HICP-food/energy1  2.6  1.8  2.5  2.6  3.5  6.5 
Latvia  HICP  2.0  2.9  6.2  6.9  6.6  10.1 
  HICP–food/energy  1.6  2.9  5.8  5.5  5.1  9.7 
Lithuania  HICP  0.3  -1.1  1.2  2.7  3.8  5.8 
  HICP-food/energy  0.6  0.7  0.7  1.3  2.4  5.2 
Poland  HICP  1.9  0.7  3.6  2.2  1.3  2.6 
  HICP-food/energy  2.0  0.6  2.8  1.2  0.6  2.1 
Hungary  HICP  5.2  4.7  6.8  3.5  4.0  7.9 
  HICP-food/energy  5.8  4.9  6.4  2.7  2.5  6.7 
Czech Rep  HICP  1.4  -0.1  2.6  1.6  2.1  3.0 
  HICP-food/energy  2.0  0.4  2.5  0.9  0.9  3.1 
Slovakia  HICP  3.5  8.4  7.5  2.8  4.3  1.9 
  HICP-food/energy  4.5  7.4  6.5  1.7  2.1  1.9 
1: HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy. 
Source: European Central Bank Convergence Report, May 2008 
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Table 3: The evolution of exchange rate regimes in NMS from 2000 to 01/2008 
  2000  2003  12/2005  01/2008 
Cyprus   
Peg to the euro 




May 2nd, 2005 
Adoption of 
Euro in 01/2008 
Czech 







Estonia  Currency board 
Currency board 
with 
peg to the euro 
ERM2 since 
July 1st, 2004  ERM2 
Latvia  Peg 
Peg to SDR 
euro weight is 29% 
(+/-1% band) 
ERM2 since 
May 2nd, 2005  ERM2 
Lithuania  Currency board 
Currency board 
with 
peg to the euro 
ERM2 since 
July 1st, 2004  ERM2 
Hungary  Crawling bands 
Peg to the euro 
(+/-15% band) 
inflation targeting 






Malta   








Poland  Crawling bands  Free float with 
inflation targeting 










Slovenia  Managed float  Managed float  ERM2 since 
July 1st, 2004 
Adoption of 
Euro in 01/2007 
Source: Von Hagen and Zhou (2002); Begg et al. (2003); EEAG Report, CESifo (2004), ECB (2005).  
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HICP  1.9  1.8  1.7  2.1  2.6  3.1  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.6  3.3  3.7 (p)  Euro  
area-15  HICP- 
energyfood  1.9  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.3  2.4  2.3  2.4  2.7  2.4  2.5(p) 
HICP  2.2  2.0  1.9  2.3  2.7  3.1  3.2  3.4  3.5  3.7  3.6  4.0 (p) 
EU-27  HICP- 
energyfood  2.1  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.7  2.7(p) 
HICP  2.1  1.9  1.9  2.2  2.6  3.0  3.1  3.3  3.4  3.6  3.5  3.8 (p) 
EU-25  HICP- 
energyfood  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.6  2.6(p) 
HICP  2.6  2.5  2.6  2.8  4.0  5.1  5.5  7.9  7.6  7.1  6.7  6.8  Czech 
Rep.  HICP- 
energyfood  3.0  2.9  3.1  3.3  3.8  4.7  5.1  7.2  7.0  6.6  6.5  6.2 
HICP  6.0  6.5  6.1  7.5  8.7  9.3  9.7  11.3  11.5  11.2  11.6  11.4 
Estonia HICP- 
energyfood  6.2  6.4  6.7  7.1  8.0  8.1  8.4  9.3  9.7  9.4  9.5  9.0 
HICP  1.7  2.3  2.2  2.3  2.7  3.2  3.7  4.1  4.7  4.4  4.3  4.6 
Cyprus  HICP- 
energyfood  1.6  2.1  2.0  1.8  2.2  2.2  2.3  2.6  2.7  2.2  2.3  2.6 
HICP  8.9  9.5  10.2  11.5  13.2  13.7  14.0  15.6  16.5  16.6  17.4  17.7 
Latvia   HICP- 
energyfood  8.8  9.8  10.6  11.1  12.2  12.7  13.0  15.2  15.9  15.7  15.9  16.0 
HICP  5.0  5.1  5.6  7.1  7.6  7.9  8.2  10.0  10.9  11.4  11.9  12.3 
Lithu.  HICP- 
energyfood  4.5  4.7  5.3  6.4  6.8  7.1  7.1  8.1  9.1  9.7  10.5  10.6 
HICP  8.5  8.3  7.1  6.4  6.9  7.2  7.4  7.4  6.7  6.7  6.8  6.9 
Hung.   HICP- 
energyfood  7.3  7.2  7.0  5.8  6.0  6.2  6.3  6.3  5.8  5.6  5.7  5.6 
HICP  -0.6  -0.2  0.6  0.9  1.6  2.9  3.1  3.8  4.0  4.3  4.1  4.1 
Malta   HICP- 
energyfood  -0.3  -0.2  0.2  0.5  1.3  2.3  2.4  3.2  3.1  3.4  3.3  3.5 
HICP  2.6  2.5  2.1  2.7  3.1  3.7  4.2  4.4  4.6  4.4  4.3  4.3 
Poland  HICP- 
energyfood  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.4  2.7  3.0  3.3  3.6  3.8  3.8  3.9  3.7 
HICP  3.8  4.0  3.4  3.6  5.1  5.7  5.7  6.4  6.4  6.6  6.2  6.2 
Slove.   HICP- 
energyfood  3.1  3.4  3.7  3.9  4.4  4.6  4.6  4.8  5.6  5.8  6.0  5.7 
HICP  1.5  1.2  1.2  1.7  2.4  2.3  2.5  3.2  3.4  3.6  3.7  4.0 
Slova.   HICP- 
energyfood  1.7  1.5  1.4  1.8  2.2  2.6  2.8  3.2  3.5  3.7  3.9  4.0 
(p): provisional 
Source: Eurostat  
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